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MICHIGAN V. BRYANT:
DEFINING THE “TESTIMONIAL
STATEMENT”
HSIEN-YING SHINE CHEN*

I. INTRODUCTION
1

Michigan v. Bryant presents an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to provide a more comprehensive definition of “testimonial
statements.” Specifically, the Court will determine whether a dying
victim’s statements to police officers regarding the circumstances of
his shooting fall within the realm of testimonial statements and thus,
2
are barred by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
The Confrontation Clause guarantees an accused defendant the right
3
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” If a witness is
unavailable for cross-examination at trial and cross-examination
previously was not possible, out-of-court statements will be admitted
only in very limited circumstances. The Supreme Court has held that
statements “made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency” are “non-testimonial” and thus, do not violate the
4
Confrontation Clause. In contrast, statements made after an
emergency has ended with the primary purpose of assisting police
prosecution are “testimonial” and inadmissible unless the
5
Confrontation Clause guarantees have been met.
In Bryant, the victim’s statements were made in response to police
questioning six blocks away from the scene of the shooting and thirty

* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Duke University School of Law
1. Michigan v. Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. argued Oct. 5, 2010).
2. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. July 29, 2009).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 813–14 (2006).
5. Id. at 822.
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minutes after the fact. The Court now has the opportunity to address
open questions regarding the scope of ongoing emergencies and the
proper perspective for determining whether a statement is
testimonial. This situation falls in the broad, uncharted gray area
6
between the Court’s two recent decisions—Davis v. Washington and
7
Crawford v. Washington —regarding the scope of protection that the
Confrontation Clause affords defendants. In Bryant, the Court will
likely elucidate the meaning and breadth of “ongoing emergency” and
“primary purpose,” by more clearly distinguishing between what is
and what is not a testimonial statement.
II. FACTS
On April 28, 2001, around 3:25 AM, five Detroit police officers
8
responded to a radio call regarding a man shot at a gas station. At the
gas station the officers found Anthony Covington lying beside his car
9
with a gunshot wound to his stomach. The officers testified that
Covington was clearly in pain as evidenced by his “moaning, facial
10
expressions, difficulty breathing and difficulty speaking.” When
asked by the officers what happened, Covington replied that “Rick”
shot him thirty minutes earlier at a house approximately six blocks
11
away from the gas station. The house was later confirmed to be
12
Richard Bryant’s place of residence. Covington further stated that
he had been conversing with a man, whose voice he recognized as
Rick’s, through the closed back door of Bryant’s house when shots
13
were fired through the door. He described “Rick” as a black male,
14
age forty, 5’7” and approximately 140 pounds. Covington was then
15
transported to the hospital, where he died a few hours later. Upon
the medical personnel’s arrival at the gas station, the police officers
and other back-up police officers headed immediately toward the

6. Id. at 813.
7. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
8. Brief for Respondent at 1, Michigan v. Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. June 16, 2010).
9. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 6.
10. People v. Bryant (Bryant I), No. 02-005508, 2007 WL 675471, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App.
Mar. 6, 2007).
11. Brief for Respondent, supra note 8, at 1.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id. at 1.
14. Id. at 2 (Subsequent investigation revealed that Richard Bryant was 30 years old, 5’10”,
and 180 pounds.).
15. Id.
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16

address provided by Covington. Although the officers did not find
the defendant at his house, they discovered blood, a bullet on the back
porch, a bullet hole through the back door, and Covington’s wallet
17
and identification.
Bryant was arrested a year later in California, and his first trial
18
resulted in a hung jury. At his second trial, however, Bryant was
convicted of second-degree murder, for being a felon in possession of
a firearm, and for the possession of a firearm during the commission
19
of a felony. Bryant appealed his conviction, claiming the trial court
erred by admitting Covington’s statements identifying Bryant as the
20
shooter in violation of his Confrontation Clause rights.
The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld Bryant’s conviction on the
grounds that the statements were non-testimonial because they “were
made in the course of a police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that its primary purpose was to enable police
21
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Recognizing that the
police officers were faced with a bleeding victim and little additional
information, the court found that the officers’ interrogation of the
victim was conducted in furtherance of responding to the ongoing
22
emergency. Thus, the court concluded that Covington’s statements in
response to the officers’ questioning were admissible, non-testimonial
23
24
hearsay. Bryant once again appealed the ruling.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Confrontation Clause guarantees an accused defendant the
25
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” The
original purpose of the Confrontation Clause, grounded in the belief

16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 4–5.
18. Id. at 4, 6.
19. Id. at 6.
20. Id. The trial court’s ruling was handed down before the Supreme Court’s Crawford and
Davis decisions. Defendant’s motion to suppress the victim’s statements to the police were
denied by the trial court, which held that the statements were admissible under the excited
utterance exception to the state hearsay rule. See MICH. R. EVID. 803(2).
21. People v. Bryant (Bryant I), No. 02-005508, 2007 WL 675471, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App.
Mar. 6, 2007).
22. Id. at 3.
23. Id.
24. People v. Bryant (Bryant II), 768 N.W.2d 65, 65 (Mich. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
Michigan v. Bryant, 130 S. Ct. 1685 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2010) (No. 09-150).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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that it would be difficult to lie while facing the accused, was to ensure
26
the veracity of trial testimony. It was also intended to prevent
government manipulation of evidence, like that which occurred
during the infamous Sir Walter Raleigh treason trial in which an
adverse ex parte affidavit was admitted without providing Sir Raleigh
27
with an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The Framers
sought to prevent a similar situation in which the defendant was
unable to confront the witness to test the authenticity of the
information recorded in an affidavit and to ensure that the
information as recorded was not manipulated by authorities.
A recent line of Supreme Court cases have helped guide lower
courts in determining whether out-of-court statements are admissible
28
or barred by the Confrontation Clause. In Crawford v. Washington,
the Supreme Court held that “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses
absent from trial [are admissible] only where the declarant is
unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior
29
opportunity to cross-examine.” The Court chose to leave “for
another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of
‘testimonial’,” but did explain that the term “applies at a minimum to
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing . . . and to police
30
interrogations.” The Court also noted that testimonial statements
could include “statements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
31
statement would be available for use at a later trial.” In light of these
principles, Crawford held that statements provided by the defendant’s
wife during a police interrogation at the police station hours after the
32
incident were inadmissible testimonial hearsay statements. This
decision overruled the Court’s prior Confrontation Clause case, Ohio
33
v. Roberts, in which the Court held that the Confrontation Clause did
not bar admission of out-of-court statements of witnesses unavailable
for cross-examination as long as the statements bore “adequate
34
indicia of reliability.”
26. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
27. Id. at 44.
28. Id. at 36.
29. Id. at 59.
30. Id. at 68.
31. Id. at 51–52 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 36.
33. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
34. Id. at 66 (The Roberts test only required the contested evidence to fall within a “firmly
rooted hearsay exception” or to bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” thereby
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35

Two years later, in Davis v. Washington, the Court inched forward
on the path toward providing clearer definitions of testimonial and
36
non-testimonial statements. The Court held that statements are
“testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is
no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant
37
to later criminal prosecution.” In contrast, “[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
38
emergency.”
In Davis, the disputed statements were made during a 911-call in
which the victim told the operator, “[The defendant is] here jumpin’
39
on me again . . . . He’s usin’ his fists.” The Davis Court found these
statements to be non-testimonial because the “primary purpose” of
40
the interrogation was to seek help during an ongoing emergency. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that: (1) the victim was
“speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than
describing past events . . . hours after the events”; (2) the victim was
facing an “ongoing emergency”; (3) “the nature of what was asked
and answered . . . was such that the elicited statements were necessary
to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to
learn (as in Crawford) what had happened in the past”; and (4) the
victim’s “frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an
41
environment that was not tranquil, or even . . . safe.” The Court
clarified that although all of these factors should be considered in
determining the testimonial nature of the statements, none of them
42
are dispositive. The Davis Court further explained that it is also
possible for a declarant’s statement to change from non-testimonial to

allowing many admissions of out-of-court statements.).
35. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
36. Richard D. Friedman, “We Really (For the Most Part) Mean It!,” 105 MICH. L. REV.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 2 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/
friedman.pdf.
37. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 828.
41. Id. at 827 (alteration omitted) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
42. Id.
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testimonial. For example, although the declarant’s identification of
the perpetrator during a 911-call was non-testimonial because the
perpetrator was in the same room and still posed a danger, when the
perpetrator fled the premises and no longer presented a danger, all
44
subsequent statements became testimonial.
45
In Hammon v. Indiana, the companion case decided alongside
Davis, the police responded to a reported domestic disturbance to
find the victim sitting on the porch alone while the defendant was
46
inside. While outside and separated from the defendant, the victim
47
told the police about the defendant hitting her. The Court held that
the victim’s statements were testimonial as “the primary, if not indeed
the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible
48
crime.” The Court distinguished Hammon from Davis by noting that
here, “the interrogation was part of an investigation in possibly
criminal past conduct” and, as the questions were meant to determine
what happened rather than “what is happening,” no ongoing
49
emergency was in progress. The Davis declarant sought aid while in
immediate danger, whereas the Hammon declarant recounted past
50
events while in the protection of the police.
The Davis decision attempted to draw a bright line between “what
51
happened” and “what is happening.” That line is not so easily drawn,
however, because answering the question of “what is happening”
often requires recounting the details of “what happened”—especially
52
in factual situations similar to the one at hand. Another concern
raised by the Davis decision is the possibility of the police
manipulating how they phrase questions when responding to
emergency calls in order to meet the Court’s ongoing emergency
53
requirement for non-testimonial statements. Although the Davis
Court’s “primary purpose” analysis focused on assessing the

43. Id. at 828–29.
44. Id.
45. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
46. Id. at 819.
47. Id. at 820.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 829–30.
50. Id. at 831.
51. Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling Around the Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not
a Robust Right, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 17–18 (2006), http://students.law.
umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/griffin.pdf.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 19.
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interrogator’s purpose throughout the opinion, it then complicated
matters within a single footnote. The Court stated that “in the final
analysis [it is] the declarant’s statements, not the interrogation’s
54
questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.”
Confrontation Clause cases currently sit on a spectrum with
Crawford and Hammon representing the testimonial-end and Davis
representing the non-testimonial end. At the Crawford/Hammon end,
statements are likely to be found testimonial when physical and
temporal separation between the interrogation and the crime is
55
present. For example, a strong indication of testimonial statements
exists if the interrogation took place in the secluded and safe
environment of the police station and the declarant provided answers
56
in a clear and calm manner, similar to a witness testifying at trial. At
the Davis end of the spectrum, factors signifying that statements are
non-testimonial include the presence of both the victim and the
perpetrator at the crime scene as a frantic narrative is given,
suggesting the criminal event is ongoing, and the lack of physical and
temporal separation between the crime and the statements being
57
uttered. Although the Supreme Court has provided clear guidance
regarding the admissibility of statements falling at either end of this
spectrum, most statements fall somewhere in the middle, resulting in
unpredictable outcomes regarding evidence admissibility in the lower
courts.
Michigan v. Bryant poses an important opportunity for the Court
to clarify the boundaries of the Confrontation Clause and the scope
of protection it affords defendants on the spectrum between the
Davis and Crawford/Hammon decisions. Until now, the Court has
avoided providing a dispositive list of criteria for determining the
58
nature of out-of-court statements, but Bryant may be the case where
the Court finally replaces the Confrontation Clause “spectrum” with a
clearer delineation between testimonial and non-testimonial
statements.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 n.1 (2006).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 64 (2004); Davis, 547 U.S. at 831.
Id.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68; Davis, 547 U.S. at 831.
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IV. HOLDING
In a 4–3 decision, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the Court of Appeals’s judgment by finding Covington’s
statements testimonial pursuant to Crawford and Davis and therefore
59
inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. The court observed
that the statements related “solely to events that had occurred in the
past and at a different location . . . . [N]one alleged any ongoing threat,
60
and none asserted the possible presence of the alleged perpetrator.”
According to the court, the primary purpose of the questioning was
not to enable police assistance to meet an “ongoing emergency,” but
rather to obtain the facts of a past event, as evidenced by the police
61
asking about “what happened” rather than “what is happening.” In
considering the Davis requirement that the final evaluation focus on
the declarant, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that it was
Convington’s primary purpose, surrounded by police officers and safe
from imminent danger, to identify the defendant in order to ensure
62
police apprehension and subsequent prosecution. The court found
Covington’s situation similar to Davis where “once the defendant
stopped attacking the victim and drove away from the premises, the
63
emergency appear[ed] to have ended.” Here, when Covington drove
to the gas station, away from the shooter, the ongoing emergency
64
effectively ended.
The majority rejected the dissent’s argument that an ongoing
emergency still existed because the criminal was still at large and the
victim was severely wounded. That proposition, the court reasoned,
would deem almost all statements made during ongoing police
65
investigations before the accused is apprehended non-testimonial.
The Michigan Supreme Court closely analogized the present case
with Hammon in that both declarants were separated from the
defendants, in the presence of police, and a period of time had passed

59. People v. Bryant (Bryant II), 768 N.W.2d 65, 79 (Mich. 2009), cert. granted sub nom.
Michigan v. Bryant, 130 S. Ct. 1685 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2009) (No. 09-150).
60. Id. at 71.
61. Id. at 75. The court noted that the behavior of the police officers at the gas station was
consistent with that of police officers investigating a past crime rather than that of officers
meeting a ongoing threat. None of the officers drew their weapons or searched for the shooter
at the station.
62. Id. at 73, 71.
63. Id. at 74.
64. Id. at 73.
65. Id.
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since the crime had been committed. Although Crawford suggests
that a dying declaration by its nature is admissible and an exception
66
to the testimonial hearsay rule, the court declined to consider this
67
In finding the statements testimonial and therefore
issue.
inadmissible, the court ruled the admission of Covington’s statements
68
to be a plain error entitling Bryant to a new trial.
The dissent argued that an ongoing emergency existed and that
the circumstances indicated that the primary purpose of the
interrogation was to enable police assistance in response to the
69
emergency. The majority, in the dissent’s view, assessed the facts in
hindsight “rather than with an objective view of the circumstances at
70
the time the statements were made[,]” as Davis required. The dissent
stated that Davis never set “an artificial threshold” for the amount of
time allowed between the initial criminal event and the utterance of
the statement before the emergency is automatically considered
71
over. The dissent distinguished Hammon from Bryant in two ways:
(1) the whereabouts of Covington’s shooter were unknown while the
Hammon assailant was known to be inside the house; and (2)
Hammon’s imminent danger threat was “negligible” relative to
72
Covington’s uncertain circumstances at the gas station. The dissent
found Bryant closer to Davis than Hammon and thus concluded that
73
Covington’s statements were non-testimonial.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Michigan’s (Petitioner's) Argument
Petitioner Michigan does not challenge the Davis standard itself,
but argues that the Michigan Supreme Court applied the standard
incorrectly in finding that the preliminary inquiries and the answers
66. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004).
67. Id. at 76–78. The prosecutor failed to seek admission of the statements as dying
declarations with the Appeals Court and the Michigan Supreme Court, while the defense
consistently asserted that the statements were not dying declarations and should not be
admitted as such. “Accordingly, the prosecutor has either effectively conceded that the victim’s
statements did not constitute a dying declaration or, at the very least, has abandoned this issue.”
Id. at 78.
68. Id. at 79.
69. Id. (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 79–80.
71. Id. at 80–81.
72. Id. at 81.
73. Id. at 82.
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given to “enable the police to identify, locate, and apprehend the
74
perpetrator” at the gas station were outside the scope of ongoing
75
emergency. Michigan urges the Supreme Court to adopt the
Michigan Court of Appeals’s conception of “ongoing emergency,”
“encompass[ing] (1) a crime still in progress, and (2) situations in
which the declarant or officer is in danger, either because of a medical
76
emergency or because the perpetrator poses a threat.”
Michigan asserts that an ongoing emergency existed because a
shooter was still at large, posing an unknown threat to public safety,
the victim, and police officers. Additionally, Covington’s bleeding
wound constituted a medical emergency and the answers he provided
between gasping breaths was not the type of formal testimony that
77
the Confrontation Clause intended to bar from trial. Michigan
argues that in order to evaluate the level of danger surrounding the
circumstances, the police officers needed to ask Covington if the
shooter was in the area, if he had shot anyone else, and if he was likely
78
to continue shooting. The questions were meant to assist police in
apprehending the dangerous shooter and phrasing the questions and
responses in the past tense does not negate the immediacy of the
potentially dangerous situation encountered by police at the gas
79
station. Further, Michigan claims that because “[t]he Court chose the
term ‘ongoing emergency,’ not ‘ongoing criminal event,’ and nothing
in the language limits the word ‘emergency’ to criminal conduct,” the
Court should not construe the scope of ongoing emergency as
80
narrowly as Bryant proposes.
To determine the “primary purpose” of the statements, Michigan
argues that the evaluation must focus on the circumstances under
which the interrogation happened, rather than the actual substance of
81
the statements. Michigan’s “primary purpose” position was
supported by the United States in its amicus brief in which former
74. Id. at 71.
75. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 9. Michigan further noted the
inconsistent decisions among the lower courts about whether such preliminary questioning
regarding “what happened” constitutes an “interrogation” separate from the issue of an ongoing
emergency.
76. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 12, Michigan v. Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. Apr. 29,
2010).
77. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 9.
78. Id. at 15.
79. Id.
80. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1, Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. July 15, 2010).
81. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 76, at 17.
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Solicitor General Kagan urged that “statements given in response to
questioning that, objectively considered, is aimed primarily at
enabling police to meet an ongoing emergency are not properly
considered testimonial. Such questioning bears little resemblance to
82
the historical abuses that animated the Confrontation Clause.”
Michigan contends that if Covington had called 911 to report the
shooting the statements clearly would have been non-testimonial like
83
in Davis. The mere fact that Covington’s statements were made in
person should not now make the statements testimonial and therefore
84
inadmissible.
Recently, the Supreme Court’s decisions have tended to
strengthen defendants’ Confrontation Clause protections in specific
85
situations when applying it to statements made by lab analysts and
86
when defining the boundaries of the forfeiture doctrine narrowly. In
Davis, however, the Court has also appeared to narrow the scope of
87
the Confrontation Clause by introducing the “primary purpose” test.
If the Court upholds the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling, it will
necessarily expand the Confrontation Clause. The bar for the
admission of out-of-court statements will be even higher because it
would suggest that most statements to the law enforcement and
emergency responders at the crime scene, even those statements
made during a standard 911-call about a recent and nearby shooting
in the midst of a medical emergency, would be considered testimonial.
Expanding the Confrontation Clause in this way will make the job of
88
prosecutors much more difficult.
B. Bryant’s (Respondent’s) Argument
Respondent Bryant contends that the phrase “ongoing
89
emergency” should be limited to the actual crime itself. Covington’s
82. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Bryant, No.
09-150 (U.S. May 6, 2010).
83. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 76, at 16.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
86. See, e.g., Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
87. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 n.1 (2006). The Davis Court overturned
Crawford’s implication that almost all statements made during police questioning would be
regarded as testimonial.
88. Andrew C. Fine, Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Clause after Davis v.
Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 11, 11 (2006),
http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/fine.pdf.
89. Brief for Respondent, supra note 8, at 25.

DO NOT DELETE

32

12/9/2010 11:58:10 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 6:21

statements were provided thirty minutes after the shooting and six
blocks away from the crime scene—the emergency had ended when
Covington drove away from the crime scene and was over by the time
90
that the police arrived at the gas station. Bryant asserts that the
police officers’ actions upon arriving at the gas station support the
91
premise that no fear of imminent danger existed.
Bryant challenges Michigan’s interpretation of “ongoing
emergency” as too broad because it would require all witness
statements taken while the perpetrator remained at large to be
considered non-testimonial and admissible in court, thereby
92
eviscerating the Confrontation Clause’s protections for the accused.
He further argues that Davis intended the “primary purpose”
examination to turn on the substance of and the purpose behind the
witness’s statement, rather than the motivations of the interrogator’s
questions and the circumstances in which the declarant was
93
questioned. Bryant contends that Covington’s statement was just a
narration of past events because there was no imminent threat that
94
Covington sought to escape. Therefore, in keeping with Davis,
Bryant argues that the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision regarding
95
the admissibility of Covington’s statements must be upheld.
As amicus for Bryant, the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers urged the adoption of a declarant’s perspective
such that “a statement’s testimonial status depends on its evidentiary
purpose—i.e., on whether the statement, objectively viewed, was
made to provide evidence in a criminal investigation or prosecution.”
96
Professor Richard Friedman advanced a similar stance in favor of
the “reasonable declarant” standard in his amicus brief: “[a] statement
should be deemed testimonial if a reasonable person in the speaker’s
position would understand that it would likely be used for
97
prosecutorial purposes.”
90. Id. at 26, 24.
91. Id. at 10 (The police testified that they did not attempt to secure the station, question
the attendant, or draw their weapons, though they did call for back-up when they arrived at
Bryant’s residence.).
92. Id. at 22.
93. Id. at 35.
94. Id. at 31.
95. Id. at 38.
96. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 3, Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. June 23, 2010).
97. Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 5,
Michigan v. Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. June 23, 2010).
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It appears that these amici are concerned that a ruling for
Michigan would affirm that lower courts are to examine the
98
interrogator’s primary purpose. With the focus away from the
declarant, the amici believe that this narrower interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause will not provide the necessary protection to
99
defendants and their right to cross-examination. Further, the amici
contend that adopting the rule proposed by Michigan would lead to
an increased admission of statements in almost all situations involving
violent perpetrators still at large because their “at-large” status would
100
automatically make the situations “ongoing emergencies.”
Accordingly, all the statements made to crime scene responders, like
police, would be admitted as non-testimonial and outside scope of the
101
Confrontation Clause. Additionally, there is concern that with a
narrowed conception of Confrontation Clause, an increase in the
admission of unreliable statements at trial will increase the likelihood
102
of false convictions. For example, a declarant in Covington’s
situation could implicate someone out of sheer maliciousness, and
these malicious statements would be admitted at trial without an
103
opportunity for cross-examination.
C. Oral Arguments
At oral arguments, the Court appeared dissatisfied with the results
104
that Davis’s standard had produced. Counsel Lori Palmer, on behalf
of Petitioner Michigan, attempted to argue that Covington’s
statements in response to police questioning lacked the formality
suggested in prior cases, but Justice Scalia quickly rejected this
contention, saying, “[f]orget about formality . . . . Formality or no
105
formality has nothing to do with it.” Justice Scalia, author of both
Crawford and Davis, noted that a rule premised on context would
result in the admission of almost all statements, given that all
questions at a crime scene could be construed as assessing the risk of

98. Id. at 6–8.
99. See id. at 9. (‘Therefore, the officer could nearly always testify, ‘My primary purpose
was not to gather evidence for use in interrogation, because I did not even know a crime had
been committed . . .’.”).
100. Id. at 10.
101. Id. at 9–10.
102. Id. at 12–13.
103. Id.
104. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2010).
105. Id. at 4.
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danger inherent in police work. With regard to the specific facts in
Bryant, Justice Scalia seemed skeptical that the police officers onsite
were actively assessing the risk when he said, “The behavior of the
police here gave no indication that they thought they were in danger
immediately and were interrogating this person in order to assess the
107
danger to them.”
Further, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor
questioned how one would go about deciphering an officer’s primary
purpose when interrogators often have dual motives of assessing risk
108
and collecting evidence. As Justice Ginsburg noted, “[T]hey would
ask the [very same] questions if what they wanted was testimonial
evidence. So you can . . . characterize that set of questions either way.
109
What would lead us to pick one rather than the other?”
The justices seemed equally dissatisfied with Michigan’s proposal
that testimonial statements are those solicited with the intent to
110
collect evidence for future prosecution. Justice Scalia expressed
doubt regarding how meaningful distinctions could be made between
questions intended to collect evidence for future prosecution from
111
those intended to apprehend the perpetrator. He was unimpressed
with the suggestion that the distinction could be based upon whether
apprehending the perpetrator would “neutralize an ongoing threat” to
public safety, given that for all violent crimes, when the violent
perpetrators are still loose in the community, they will perpetually
112
pose a possible threat to public safety.
The justices expressed strong disapproval when Counsel Peter Jon
Van Hoek, on behalf of Respondent Bryant, argued that the focus
should be on the content of the declarant’s statement, and that
“ongoing emergency” should be based upon a formal boundary of
whether the event was an ongoing or a past event and whether there
113
is any indication of “immediacy.” Chief Justice Roberts skeptically
asked, “[W]hat would you do with the statement ‘The guy in the gas
station shot me’? Is that purely past or is that an ongoing

106. Id. at 18. For example, Justice Scalia asked, “[a]nd you’re saying, whenever policemen
come upon a victim of violent crime and said who did it, what’s his name, all of that will always
be admissible because they—they could be assessing the risk, right?”
107. Id. at 14.
108. Id. at 5–7.
109. Id. at 25–26.
110. Id. at 21.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 22.
113. Id. at 36, 59.
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114

emergency?” Justice Alito also questioned, “[C]an there be an
ongoing emergency where the statement . . . recounts something that
115
has occurred, not something that is occurring?” Bryant’s counsel
responded that it was possible and eventually conceded that context
needed to be considered to determine whether a declaration about
116
past events was properly testimonial.
Justices Kennedy and Alito seemingly favored a broader scope for
117
“ongoing emergency.” Justice Kennedy stated that even though dual
motives for collecting evidence might always be present, the fact that
“you do not know if the man is running amok and threatening to
shoot other people” is enough to possibly justify “ongoing
118
emergency” in this case. Justice Ginsburg suggested that the case
could be solved by the dying declaration exception when she asked
Michigan’s counsel, “[I]f you had the benefit of hindsight, and this
trial occurred before Davis . . . would you have instead tried to make a
119
case that this was a dying declaration?” Justice Scalia disagreed with
Justice Ginsburg by noting that, with the exception of forfeiture, “I
don’t know of any cases that allow a dying declaration in over a
120
Confrontation Clause objection.”
Justice Kennedy questioned
whether Davis was essentially testing reliability as under the
121
overturned Roberts framework, all over again.
VI. ANALYSIS
As evidenced by these arguments and the justices’ responses,
there are competing viewpoints regarding the “primary purpose” of
the interrogation because the Court has left open the issue of whose
purpose is being examined. Those who believe that the Confrontation
Clause’s central purpose is to ensure reliable statements at trial are
more likely to argue that the Court is referring to the declarant’s
122
purpose. Those who believe the Confrontation Clause’s primary
114. Id. at 46.
115. Id. at 45.
116. Id. at 44.
117. Id. at 13.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 20.
120. Id. at 43.
121. Id. at 27, 28. (“What would be the rationale for admitting this statement, then? Is it
more reliable? Because if we say that, then we’re undercutting Crawford, which says reliability
is not the key . . . because the police likely have less motive to manipulate the statements and to
ask loaded questions? That in itself, it seems to me, is a reliable . . . .”).
122. Griffin, supra note 51, at 20.
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purpose is to protect defendants from government manipulation of
evidence are more likely to argue that it is the interrogator’s purpose
123
that should be the focus. It seems too simplistic to consider primary
purpose purely from either the declarant’s perspective or the
124
interrogator’s perspective. While law enforcement often have dual
motives—to collect evidence and to respond to an ongoing
emergency—it is equally likely for a declarant to have dual motives of
making an accusatory statement for prosecution and to provide facts
in order to receive the appropriate and necessary help during an
125
In fact, while the dual motives of law
ongoing emergency.
enforcement could be characterized as fairly straightforward and
predictable, it is likely more problematic for a court to assess the
declarant’s personal motivations and intentions. With the presence of
law enforcement, the declarant’s purpose will be influenced in terms
of how he thinks his answers will be used and perhaps his answers will
change in tone, whether accusatory or frantic, in response to how the
126
police officer is phrasing his questions. The police officer and the
declarant will always have an influence on each other and each
other’s perception of what is occurring. It is possible that the Court’s
vague pronouncements in recent Confrontation Clause decisions have
been attempts to consider the perspectives of both the declarant and
law enforcement, and perhaps this is why the Court has avoided
127
confirming exactly whose perspective is being examined. As police
interrogations and the nature of criminal events are rarely
straightforward and often have multiple motives at play, the
ambiguity regarding whose perspective is being considered affords
the Court flexibility in reaching its decisions. While this flexibility has
been convenient for the Supreme Court in developing its
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, it has led to split decisions in

123. Id. at 19.
124. Tom Lininger, Davis and Hammon: A Step Forward, or a Step Back?,
105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28, 29 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/
firstimpressions/vol105/lininger.pdf.
125. Id.
126. See Friedman, supra note 36, at 3 (“Could it be that the interrogator’s purpose is
significant because of the light it sheds on the declarant’s understanding of the situation?”).
127. See Robert P. Mosteller, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana: Beating
Expectations, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 6, 10 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/
mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/mosteller.pdf. (“Davis, however, did not resolve the issue of whose
intent counts . . . . Although being interested in both the intent of the questioner and the speaker is
unusual, it is quite appropriate for the Confrontation Clause.”).
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128

lower courts.
Speculation persists regarding why the Court chose to emphasize
the “ongoing emergency” standard as one of the markers of nontestimonial statements and why the Court chose to reserve a special
129
place for statements made during an emergency situation. It is
unclear whether the justices made this distinction because they
believe that the declarant’s reliability will be at its utmost while he is
seeking help, or if they believe that law enforcement agents are less
likely to manipulate evidence for future prosecution when they are
responding to an emergency. There is certain irony that in a relatively
short time period, the Court has blazed from Roberts to Crawford to
Davis a Confrontation Clause path that seemingly has come full circle
130
and re-focused on the reliability of the statements —the core of the
overturned Roberts standard. Depending on the course that the Court
chooses to follow on Davis–Crawford spectrums, its decision will have
a major impact on the application and effect of the Confrontation
Clause to crime scene statements.
VII. LIKELY DISPOSITION
The Supreme Court will likely reverse the Michigan Supreme
Court’s decision. Recently, the Supreme Court has engaged in a
reinvigorated inspection of the Confrontation Clause premised on
cases with specific factual scenarios that allow them to be placed as
defining marks on the Confrontation Clause spectrum. As Bryant
indicates, the difficulty in drawing a line between testimonial and nontestimonial statements is indicative of the tension between protecting
the defendant’s constitutional right to confront his accuser and the
search for truth that might require admission of potentially damaging
131
statements at trial. This is not to suggest that the Confrontation
128. See Lininger, supra note 124, at 28 (“[L]ower court judges hoped that the Supreme
Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana . . .
would provide a primer on testimonial hearsay . . . . In fact, the Davis ruling raised nearly as
many questions as it answered.”).
129. See id. at 31. (“One category of unresolved questions relates to the definition of
‘testimonial’ hearsay. Just how can police—or judges, for that matter—determine precisely
when an emergency has ended?”).
130. Griffin, supra note 51, at 18.
131. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (“The focus of the Court’s concern has been to
insure that there ‘are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of
whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the
declarant.”). Though the Roberts decision may have been overturned, that Court’s primary
concern is still relevant today.
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Clause’s constitutional guarantee of cross-examination is always at
odds with the search for the truth, which would be a clear
oversimplification, but merely to highlight the delicate balance that
must be achieved in distinguishing between testimonial and nontestimonial statements.
As the Bryant oral arguments confirmed, Confrontation Clause
cases have produced interesting alignments among the Justices. The
Supreme Court will likely hold that Covington’s statements were nontestimonial because they were meant to enable the police’s primary
purpose of responding appropriately to an “ongoing emergency.” In
keeping with their positions in past decisions, the unlikely
Confrontation Clause duo of Justices Ginsburg and Scalia will likely
depart from the majority and vote to affirm the Michigan Supreme
Court’s holding that the statements were testimonial. Justices
Ginsburg and Scalia will likely find that the emergency had ended,
and, because they tend to emphasize an analysis that centers on the
motives of the declarant, they will likely note that Covington
provided statements at that time to implicate the defendant, not to
132
seek help.
Justice Thomas, the sole dissenter in Hammon, likely will find
Covington’s final remarks to not possess the “necessary[y] degree of
133
solemnity” to meet his conception of a testimonial statement.
Justices Kennedy and Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts dissented in
134
favor of admitting lab evidence in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
another Confrontation Clause case involving the admissibility of lab
reports when the prosecution did not provide the opportunity for the
135
defendant to cross-examine the lab analysts. There, these three
justices stated that they would limit the Confrontation Clause to
“witnesses like those in Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial . . . conventional
witness[es] responding to questions under interrogation” and even
though they acknowledged that the Crawford and Davis victims were
relatively traditional as witnesses, Covington, a dying victim on the

132. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2529 (2009); Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 814–16 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36–37 (2004).
133. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
134. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
135. See generally id. (holding that drug test reports are testimonial within the meaning of
the Confrontation Clause).
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ground, would likely not be considered by these same justices to be a
136
“conventional witness.”
Although he previously aligned himself with Justices Ginsburg
and Scalia in Crawford and Davis, Justice Breyer’s show of remorse
during oral arguments for supporting Crawford’s broadening of the
Confrontation Clause suggests that he may join Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts, in concluding that
Covington’s statements were non-testimonial and properly admitted
137
at trial. This speculation is supported in part by his dissent in
Melendez-Diaz, which was Justice Breyer’s first step toward limiting
just how the Confrontation Clause had expanded following
138
Crawford. The Melendez-Diaz dissent, in contrast to the majority’s
emphasis on cross-examination, seemed to place much importance on
the accepted reliability of scientific evidence in reports and as it was
the best evidence, it should be admissible without the requirement
139
that the analyst, an unconventional witness, testify. In Bryant,
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts will
probably regard Covington’s last words as reliable and contrary to the
conventional-accusatory-witness mold that the Confrontation Clause
was originally concerned about, and that his death should not
preclude their admission. They seem to be most concerned about the
potential of law enforcement to manipulate the statement. Thus
ultimately it may be that these four justices do not want the
Confrontation Clause to serve as a bar to the best evidence where a
witness’s unavailability was not due to police manipulation and the
statements were provided during an emergency.
140
Despite Justice Sotomayor’s five years as a former prosecutor,
her vote remains somewhat of a mystery, as she has not favored the
prosecution in her other criminal procedure cases since joining the
141
Supreme Court. And the Court’s most recent appointee, Justice
Kagan, recused herself from this case because she authored the
136. Id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
137. Transcript of Oral Argument at 135–36, Bryant, No. 09-150 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2010). (“What
is the constitutional rationale? I agreed on joining Crawford, but I have to admit to you I’ve had
many second thoughts when I’ve seen how far it has extended as I have written it.”).
138. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2551.
139. Id. at 2543.
140. Office of the Press Secretary, Judge Sonia Sotomayor, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 26,
2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Background-on-Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor/.
141. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316, 1316 (2010).
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United States’ amicus brief in support of Michigan.
Bryant will likely be a 5–3 or a 6–2 decision reversing the
Michigan Supreme Court. The Court will use this opportunity to
clarify the meaning behind “ongoing emergency” and “primary
purpose” within the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. The
meaning of what is a testimonial statement has caused great confusion
among the lower courts in fact patterns similar to Bryant. This
confusion brings into question Davis’s workability in defining the
boundaries of what is an “ongoing emergency” and from whose
perspective the Court should look to when evaluating whether a
statement is testimonial. But, rather than attempting to distinguish
between what is and is not an emergency, the Court may opt to use
Bryant to develop an entirely new definition of what is testimonial
with respect to the Confrontation Clause.

